Introduction
Taking office in 2013, United Nations Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect, Jennifer Welsh, stated that her primary goal is to advance understanding of 'international assistance' claiming that it is the 'most promising aspect of the Responsibility to Protect'.  Pillar I, 'the protection responsibilities of states': the domestic responsibilities of states to protect people (not just citizens) from the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.  Pillar II, 'international assistance and capacity building': the international community provides assistance to help the target state to protect its population from the four crimes, such as the cases of Mali, the Central African Republic and Iraq.
1 Interview with Jennifer Welsh, 'R2P is dead, long live R2P: the future of the responsibility to protect', Stanley Foundation, 8 Nov. 2013, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/edward-luck/5223-stanleyfoundation-r2p-is-dead-long-live-r2p-interview-with-dr-jennifer-welsh, accessed 1 Jan. 2014.
 Pillar III, 'timely and collective response': the international community takes collective action (under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter) without the consent of the state in question, because the UN Security Council judges it to be 'manifestly failing' to protect its population from the four crimes, as in the case of Libya.
To paraphrase Wight, the three pillars are not like 'three railroad tracks running parallel into infinity' 4 and instead, as Bellamy explains, they are 'conceptually intertwined ' . 5 Yet whilst this is true, it seems fair to say that pillar II remains the most overlooked and under-researched of the three pillars. 6 Helping to address this lacuna, in August 2014, the UNSG released his sixth RtoP report which notably focused specifically on pillar II. 7 The report advanced the understanding of pillar II set out in 2009, 8 and formed the basis of the General Assembly informal interactive dialogue in September 2014 which saw UN Member States present their views of pillar II.
9
More recently, the UNSG's seventh RtoP report expanded further on 'international assistance and capacity-building', 10 prior to the 2015 informal interactive dialogue where a total of '1 Regional Organisation (the European Union) and 69 Member States spoke on behalf of 89 countries'.
11
The purpose of this article is to build and expand on the groundwork laid by the UNSG. To do this, the article is structured in four sections. Section one provides an overview of pillar II to flesh out what is means but also to underline the different forms of response and different actors involved. Section two identifies the consensual support within the UN General Assembly as one of its key strengths. Section three highlights the utility of pillar II through a focus on the threat of mass violence posed by non-state armed groups in the 21 st century. Section four asks 4 I draw here on Wight's seminal description of the three traditions that underpin the English School approach, see M. Wight, International theory: the three traditions, G. Wight and B. Porter (eds.), (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992), p. 260. 5 This is why Bellamy rejects the idea of sequencing, Alex Bellamy, The responsibility to protect: a defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p.193. 6 The former UN Special Advisor of the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, made this point in his Keynote Speech, 'The responsibility to protect in theory and practice', Ljubljana, Slovenia, April 2012. 7 Report of the UN Secretary-General, 'Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the responsibility to protect' (A/68/947/S/2014/449), 12 Aug. 2014. 8 Report of the UN Secretary-General, 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect' (A/63/667), esp. pp. 15-22. 9 The President of the General Assembly's overview can be found at http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/68/pdf/letters/932014Responsibility%20to%20Protect%20-%203%20September%202014.pdf, accessed 11 May 2015. 10 Report of the UN Secretary-General, 'A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect' (A/69/981-S/2015/500) esp. pp. 9-15. 11 The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: 'A vital and enduring commitment: Implementing the responsibility to protect,' 8 Sept. 2015, http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/797 accessed 09 Sept 2015 the question 'who is being assisted?' to raise concerns over the legitimacy of the government seeking assistance. Essentially, sections two and three underline the promise of pillar II which poses a direct challenge to all those that claim the RtoP is dead. At the same time, section four raises concerns that need to be factored into future pillar thinking and implementation. In so doing, it develops the 'challenges and recommendations' outlined by the UNSG. 13 Overall, the article develops this research agenda for it is evident that there is an urgent need to gain a more informed understanding of pillar II. As Ban Ki-moon states, 'The everyday reality of populations in current crises, including those in the Central African Republic, Iraq and South Sudan, also illustrates vividly why such international assistance is more important than ever'. 14 Such crises have seen calls for international assistance in the wake of tens of thousands of civilians killed, millions of people displaced, and millions more in need of humanitarian assistance.
15

What is pillar II?
The World Summit Outcome Document states that 'the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility'. It goes on to say 'we also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out'. 19 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'The relationship between the responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians in armed conflict', Policy Brief, 9 May 2011, p. 1. Also, Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations (Department of peacekeeping operations and the office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs, 2009), p. 21. 24 UNSG report 'Fulfilling our collective responsibility', pp. [19] [20] . 25 The UNSG explains, '[I]n some cases, such as the Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) establishing the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), peacekeepers were explicitly mandated to support national authorities in implementing their responsibly to protect'. UNSG report 'Fulfilling our collective responsibility', p.17.
26
Thierry Tardy, 'The dangerous liaisons of the responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations', Global Responsibility to Protect, 4:4, 2012, pp. 424-448. 27 Hugh Breakey, Angus Francis, Vesselin Popovski, Charles Sampford, Michael G. Smith, and Ramesh Thakur Enhancing protection capacity: a policy guide to the responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians in armed conflicts (Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, 2012), p. xxv to uphold a commitment to 'impartiality' rather than 'neutrality'.
28 Yet clearly, pillar II is about assisting a preferred actor and does not set out to be impartial. Therefore as policymakers and analysts respond to the UNSG's 2015 call (to overcome the tendency to differentiate between these related activities) such aspects will need to be further reflected on and addressed in due course.
The core purpose of the pillar II report is to outline 'ways in which national, regional, and international actors can assist States in fulfilling their responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity'. 29 At its simplest level, therefore, pillar II can be thought of as state x requesting assistance to protect its population from the four crimes and the international community providing it. As the statement also explains, this may involve a hybrid approach as 'international community' is broken down to highlight the role that multilateral organisations, regional and sub-regional actors, non-governmental organisations and civil society groups can play in facilitating the RtoP. 34 The same problem has been raised with regard to the assistance provided in South Sudan and the Central African Republic as regional states acted to serve their own vested interest, see Spencer Zifcak, 'Missing in action: the security council and the responsibility to prevent mass atrocities in Central Africa', in Vasilka Sancin (ed.), Responsibility to protect: where do we stand ten years after? (Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, 2015), p. 320. 35 has acted as 'a powerful catalyst for deeper international engagement'. 38 In public, such states reject any perceived condemnation but this can lead them to engage more with the international community behind closed doors. To be clear, the crisis in DPRK would actually come under pillar III of the RtoP, because a) the state in question is perpetrating mass violence and is therefore 'manifestly failing' to protect its population from the four crimes, and b) it does not consent to the international community intervening to protect the population of DPRK. At the same time, however, if such extreme cases do evidence (as Bellamy argues) that public scrutiny can facilitate progress, then this does give credence to the idea that, a part of pillar II's promise lies in its focus on encouragement.
Regarding capacity-building, if the state in question is unable rather than unwilling to protect their population from the four crimes then there is nothing to be gained by condemning it. A 'needs assessment' is therefore required on a case-by-case basis and the UNSG outlines seven capacities that aid the mitigation of the four crimes. 41 The international community must identify what capacity is needed and how this can best be implemented through discussions at the local, national, and international level. Two key aspects are identified: "inhibitors" and "watchdogs". The former focuses on 'the particular capacities, institutions and actors that help prevent escalation from risk imminent crises'.
42
The latter focuses on building 'concrete support and skills development' for those that 'can hold authorities to account' 43 , the culmination of which is that pillar II asks us to think carefully about strengthening the capacity of states, but, furthermore, about incorporating checks and balances to reduce the threat of mass violence.
The third form of assistance focuses on 'assisting states' in times of 'impending crises' through: 'The seven inhibitors include a professional and accountable security sector; impartial institutions for overseeing political transitions; independent judicial and human rights institutions; the capacity to assess risk and mobilize early response; local capacity to resolve conflicts; media capacity to counteract prejudice and hate speech; and capacity for effective and legitimate transitional justice', Report of the UNSG, 'A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect', p. 10, footnote 20. 42 UNSG report, 'Fulfilling our collective responsibility' , p.10 43 UNSG report, 'Fulfilling our collective responsibility' , p.10 interest at stake. Prior to exploring the challenges facing pillar II further in section four, section two and three illustrate the promise of pillar II.
Consensual support
It is widely accepted that consensus plays a critical role in the construction of international legitimacy. This is not to suggest that consensus is in itself enough, but that in order to establish an understanding of 'rightful conduct' in legal, moral, and political terms, it is necessary to gain what Clark refers to as a 'tolerable consensus'.
49 One of the key strengths of pillar II, therefore, is that it has the backing of the international community. To understand this it is important to consider the relationship between pillar II and state sovereignty. This is placed at the heart of Ban Ki-moon's interpretation as he explains the 'sprit of pillar II':
At the 2005 World Summit, States committed to assist one another to succeed in fulfilling their responsibility to protect, not just to react if they fail. Pillar II is therefore a reminder that the responsibility to protect is intended to reinforce, not undermine, sovereignty.
50
In the aftermath of the controversy that surrounded the intervention in Libya, 51 the statement forms part of the UN narrative which seeks to highlight support for pillar II amongst states precisely because it is intended 'to reinforce, not undermine, sovereignty'. This reflects the UNSG's broader view that the RtoP as a whole (not just pillar II) should be understood as a friend of sovereignty, the purpose of RtoP 'is to build responsible sovereignty, not to undermine it'. We positively assess the attempt in the report to formulate a general code of principles to provide international assistance. It is not exhaustive, of course, but it contains some important items. In particular, we fully agree that the key to success of any international assistance is greater consideration of national ownership. 54 Firstly, we would like to emphasize that assistance should always be requested by the concerned state before it is offered. This is cornerstone for us as far as R2P is concerned.
55
The international community in providing assistance should strictly abide by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, respect sovereign equality and national leadership in order to avoid the negative impact on the national situation.
56
The appeals to 'state equality', 'national ownership', and 'consent' seek to reaffirm the rules Another critique of such consensus is that the state narrative that underpins pillar II serves states. government concerned...The number one priority is to get agreement of the given government in a given situation'. 66 The statement reflects that even those responsible for the four crimes may in fact
show support for pillar II as they emphasise state consent and state sovereignty. 67 To be clear, RtoP scholars do not advocate assisting such states. 69 If state x is found to be 'manifestly failing' to protect its population then the international community can use all the coercive and non-coercive measures available under pillar III without first exploring the options available under pillar II. Yet, to return to Hehir, RtoP analysts need to continue to reflect on their own role in the construction and reproduction of knowledge.
Overall, the consensual support for pillar II -even by those states that opposed the way RtoP was implemented in Libya -reveals that state representatives see the positive role that it can play as weak states, failing states, and states under stress strive to fulfil pillar I. To understand this further, it is important to consider the role that international assistance has in addressing the threat posed by non-state armed groups.
Non-State Armed Groups
The purpose of this section is to highlight that a key strength of pillar II lies in its potential for addressing the threat of mass violence posed by non-state armed groups in the 21 st century. At its broadest level, pillar II sets out to address the 'nature and dynamics of atrocity crimes'. Republic demonstrate that this is recognised as a key challenge. 71 Critically, pillar II can play a role. Within such circumstances, the state becomes the very architect of the life it had classically been envisaged to prevent: 'poor, nasty, brutish, and short'. 73 It is the power of the state therefore that scholars have traditionally focused on. As Levene explains, 'whilst there is no prima facie case why the state has to be the genocidal agent…it is hard to imagine a modern annihilation campaign without state involvement'. 74 The problem with this conceptualisation of violence, however, is that it fails to acknowledge the rise of non-state actors in the modern world. Critically, weak states, failing states, or states under stress may not have the capacity to address the threat posed by non-state armed groups, and, within such circumstances, international assistance could significantly increase the chances of human protection.
To better understand the threat posed by non-state armed groups, the graph below provides data gathered by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which compares and contrasts levels of one-sided fatalities between 1989-2013 by two types of actors: governments and rebel groups. 75 Although mass atrocity crimes do not always occur within the context of war, it is widely accepted that the risk of atrocity crimes 'is more prevalent during armed conflict, especially internal armed conflict'. 76 For instance, Alex Bellamy's study explains that 'of 103 episodes of mass killing (defined as a minimum of 5,000 civilians killed intentionally) observed since 1945…69 cases (67%) occurred within, and 34 cases (33%) occurred outside, a context of armed conflict'. 77 The graph's illustration therefore of violence against civilians in war has three points of relevance for the RtoP.
First, even if we combine the number of fatalities committed by rebel groups and governments in the 21 st century, the total number of fatalities has never exceeded 15,000. This gives credence to the idea that there is an overall declining level of violence in international relations. 78 Second, in thirteen of the fourteen years since 2000, rebel groups were the primary perpetrators of one sided mass killing. Third, the peak of 40,000 killed in 1994 juxtaposed with the fact that the data does not capture the violence conducted by the Syrian government in 2014-15 reflects that we should never be complacent to the threat posed by governments.
addressing the structural issues, would be a total waste of time and money'. 87 Therefore, whilst the Defence Committee urged the UK Government to increase international assistance, they also raised profound concerns over the type of assistance provided. The example begins to demonstrate that focusing on non-state armed groups is one thing; successfully addressing their threat is something very different.
To take another example, the rise of the Boko Haram in Nigeria juxtaposed with claims that former President Goodluck Jonathan lacked the political will to address this threat raises profound problems for international assistance. As Owen and Usman explain, the failure of Jonathan's administration to manage the economy, in particular corruption in the oil industry had security implications as this facilitated the rise of the Boko Haram. 88 Moreover, the mismanaged response to the abduction of 279 school girls in April 2014 'convinced many citizens that the Nigerian state was no longer interested in or able to fulfil the one role in which it had traditionally excelled: a powerful, if violent, paternalist leviathan providing security of last resort'. 89 In RtoP terms, the government seemed to be unwilling and/or unable to address the threat posed by Boko Haram.
Furthermore, Amnesty International drew attention to the fact that senior members of the military conducted war crimes themselves. 90 Accordingly, the example highlights critical challenges facing international assisters. The US responded to the abduction by setting out increased international assistance 91 but even this was criticised by the Nigerian government which claimed the US was unintentionally aiding the Boko Haram.
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When one considers the role that non-state armed groups will play in the perpetration of mass violence in the 21 st century, it is simply absurd to suggest that the RtoP is dead. It is here that the promise of pillar II lies. Although we should never become complacent to the threat posed by governments, it is also important to develop assistance measures that can enable states to protect their populations from the four crimes. Yet, as the example of Iraq begins to illustrate, debates over 87 posed by DAESH. 107 Tragically, these air strikes are estimated to have led to the deaths of over 584 civilians at this time of writing which act as a chilling reminder that any use of force, even consensual, carries the risk of civilians being killed. 108 The crises in countries such as Mali, Iraq, Nigeria and South Sudan expose the profound challenges facing pillar II. Going forward, analysts and policymakers need to get to grips with 'the problem of dirty hands'. On one hand, vulnerable groups may be exposed to the real threat posed by non-state armed groups, but, on the other hand, the governments seeking assistance to fight these groups may be either failing to establish 'effective, legitimate and inclusive governance' (to use the UNSG's words) or, worse, involved in committing crimes against civilians. To take the case of Nigeria, Human Rights Watch remind us the US, the UK, and the UN have continued to criticise 'the abusive conduct of the Nigerian security forces' but this 'has not resulted in meaningful change'. 109 A moral dilemma therefore arises as no one wants to expose vulnerable groups to even greater risks but at the same time, we do not want to unintentionally embed bad governance through assistance. The water is muddied somewhat by three factors. First, it could be that the government in question is committing violence but this does not qualify as one of the four crimes and therefore does not indicate a 'manifest failing'
whereby options under pillar III would be considered. 110 Second, the government may be judged to pose less of a threat to civilians than the non-state armed group. Third, the government may simply be viewed as the best option available for tackling the non-state armed group. Quickly, we begin to see that there is no easy answer. Furthermore, the premise of the RtoP is that each crisis should be dealt with on a 'case-by-case' basis and that no one size fits all rule can be established. This is precisely because of the difficulties, complexities, and tradeoffs involved in such extreme political environments.
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In terms of tentative recommendations, this author draws insight from Paul Williams' study of US assistance in Africa in which he explains:
To better support effective peace operations in Africa, the United States should take the following steps. First, Washington should use selectivity (supporting existing good practices) rather than conditionality (providing assistance on the promise of the recipient reforming its activities in the future) as the principal criterion for choosing bilateral security partners in Africa and devise metrics for evaluating partner performance.
112
Although the statement focuses on the US, broader lessons can be learnt, especially for Western states whose power to influence non-Western states is widely accepted to be declining. Within a pillar II context, the appeal to selectivity rather than conditionality implies assisters should be wary of providing assistance based on assurances from the requesting government that they will change their ways. For example, the governments of Nigeria and South Sudan have both been condemned by human rights organisations for conducting war crimes and crimes against humanity and, therefore, need to evidence substantive changes before they are assisted further. 113 This, of course, brings us back to the troubling question, what about the victims?
With this in mind, this author stresses that the appeal to selectivity is referenced as something to bear in mind rather than a cast iron rule. As stated, assisters 'should be wary' of providing assistance based on future commitments. This is not the same as suggesting they should never provide such assistance. To draw on Walzer, such moral dilemmas require us to consider 'emergency ethics' and the stark reality is that each crisis will reveal a moral dilemma that needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 114 There is no silver bullet but as the RtoP enters its second decade since the World Summit, such emergency ethics need greater consideration within the context of pillar II.
Conclusion
There is a striking disconnect between the importance of pillar II on one hand and the lack of research into it on the other. Addressing this, the article strives to develop a dialogue on the added value of pillar II. First, it provides an overview of pillar II to highlight that it can represent a hybrid response that incorporates many different types of assistance by a variety of actors. This is positive in that it increases the capacity at the supply side of the equation. 
